Opinion Aggregation
Opinion aggregation problems arise when a number of individuals express different opinions on some set of variables (the 'agenda') and we wish to combine them into a single consistent 'collective' opinion on each variable. General methods for solving problems of this kind have been extensively studied in different domains -for instance in social choice theory, in statistics and in judgment aggregation theory -typically by identifying the class of methods satisfying one or more constraints. And although the kinds of opinions (votes, probability estimates, acceptances of propositions, etc.,) that that serve as inputs differ in these studies, as do the attendant notions of consistency of opinion, very similar constraints on aggregation are invoked in all of them.
Three of the most common of such constraints are especially relevant to our discussion.
They are:
1. Universal Domain: The requirement that the method of opinion aggregation be applicable to any combination of individual opinion.
Independence:
The requirement that the collective opinion on any particular variable depend only on the individuals' opinion on that variable and not on their opinions on any other variable.
Unanimity Preservation:
The requirement that any opinion unanimously held by individuals be retained in the collective opinion.
Although the precise implication of these constraints on aggregation methods depends on the exact form of the opinion aggregation problem, in combination they severely constrain the class of admissible aggregation methods. Indeed in some well-known cases 2 they suffice to restrict us to dictatorial methods i.e. to those methods which assign a collective value to each variable as a function of opinion of a single individual. This paper studies the effect of these conditions in the context of a common type of opinion aggregation problem, termed an allocation problem, and in particular those in which the set of permissible opinions is finite. Allocation problems are opinion aggregation problems in which both individuals' opinions and the collective opinion are required to sum to a fixed value. A very simple and familiar kind of allocation problem is when individuals must vote for one, and only one, of a set of alternative proposals and one, and only one proposal, must be collectively accepted. Another is when a fixed amount of money is available to spend on a number of alternative goods or projects and individuals hold different opinions on how much should be spent on each. In this case the sum of the proposed amounts to be spent on each alternative, as well as the finally agreed amounts, must sum to the available budget. Finally, we face an allocation problem when individuals make probability judgments on a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions, for then the sum of these probabilities, as well as the sum of the aggregate ones, must equal one.
Any general method for forming a collective opinion in allocation problems will be termed an allocation aggregation method. In Lehrer and Wagner (1981) it was shown that in cases in which the set of possible opinion values is infinite (specifically an interval of real numbers) versions of the Universal Domain, Independence and Unanimity Preservation conditions suffice to constrain the class of allocation aggregation methods to those taking the form of linear averages with non-negative weights. In this note we extend their treatment to the case of 'realistic' allocation problems, namely ones in which the set of possible opinion values is finite. The main result of the paper is the following:
in realistic allocation aggregation problems the only aggregation methods consistent with only the three conditions are the dictatorial ones.
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we review the results of Lehrer and Wagner (1981) characterizing linear averaging rules in the case infinite valuation domains before 3 stating our 'dictatorship' result for finite domains. In subsequent sections, we consider the implications of the theorem and relation to the existing literature. All proofs are contained in an appendix.
Allocation Aggregation Problems
An n  m matrix A = (a ij ) is an s-allocation matrix if (1) each entry of A is a nonnegative real number and (2) 
Zero Preservation (ZP) For all j {1,…,m} and all AA(n,m;s,V): Theorem 2 is the main plank of our claim that realistic allocation aggregation must be dictatorial if it satisfies the trio of conditions: Universal Domain, Independence and Unanimity Preservation. In the final section, we examine the three conditions with a view to assessing the scope of the theorem. But before this we turn to a comparison of Theorem 2 with similar results to be found in the literature on opinion aggregation.
Dictatorship in Opinion Aggregation
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The existing literature on opinion aggregation can be divided into two main groups. The first consists of work that assumes that every valuation domain is a continuum: prominent examples include the work on probability aggregation found mainly in statistics and the work on utility aggregation found in social choice theory. The second consists of work that assumes a binary valuation domain: prominent examples here include the work on ordinal preference aggregation in social choice theory and that in the new field of judgment aggregation.
1 Theorem 2 fills something of the space in between the two. In doing so it reveals an interesting connection between the characterizations of linear averaging found in the first group and the dictatorship results of the second. In short,
conditions that allow arbitrary linear averaging when the valuation domain is a continuum force such averaging to take the extreme form of a dictatorship when the valuation domain is finite.
To add a bit more substance to this claim, let us consider how Theorem 2 sheds some light on the dictatorship results for proposition-wise independent judgment aggregation.
In a typical judgment aggregation problem a set of individuals face a set of logically interconnected propositions, called the agenda, upon which they must reach a collective
opinion. An agenda is assumed to be closed under negation, and individuals must either Dietrich and List (2010) , which shows that any proposition-wise aggregation rule that satisfies a condition that they call implication preservation (which requires the aggregate judgment set to be consistent with p implying q whenever all individuals' sets are), is a linear averaging rule when the judgments are probabilistic and a dictatorial rule when they are binary.
Assessment
In response to dictatorship results such as Theorem 2, it is natural to re-examine the conditions under which these results are derived. If further reflection suggests that they are unnecessarily stringent, then one might wish to seek out weaker conditions which 7 allow for a broader class of aggregation methods while still ensuring a principled synthesis of individually differing allocations. Successful identification of such weaker conditions would show that the dictatorship results, while perhaps mathematically interesting, pose no real dilemma for group decision making.
How then might the conditions under which Theorem 2 was derived be modified?
Condition ZP, which requires that aggregation respect the group's unanimity in assigning a variable the value zero, strikes us as eminently reasonable. aggregation. Yet they continue to feature (sometimes supplemented by normalization in order to satisfy an allocation constraint) in many treatments of group decision making.
2 Foregoing ZP might be reasonable if individuals in the group were only serving as advisors to an external decision maker with the ultimate power to choose an allocation. But, at least when V is a continuum, this does not significantly enlarge the set of acceptable AAMs. See Aczél, et al (1984) . In the presence of IA, the condition ZP is equivalent to s-Preservation : For all j{1,…,m}, and all AA(n,m;s), A j = s  F(A) j = s. So we may substitute s-Preservation for ZP in Theorems 2, 4, and 5. Indeed this might be preferable since, in isolation , s-Preservation is weaker than ZP, and, as Franz Dietrich has pointed out to us, s-Preservation corresponds nicely to the condition of judgment-set-wise unanimity preservation in judgment aggregation. See Dietrich (2006) . 3 We are grateful to the anonymous referee for this point.
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The reason for this is to be found in the universal domain axioms that typically underlie, either explicitly or implicitly, axiomatic analyses of such decision making. 4 For if a method of aggregating differing opinions must be prepared to handle every logically possible profile of opinions, it is hard to imagine how to specify such a method without proceeding variable-by-variable (resp., proposition-by-proposition, state-by-state, or event-by-event). There are cases in which abandoning the Universal Domain condition allows for principled ways of resolving disagreement in a holistic manner not hobbled by IA. 5 But in the present one, it is hard to see how restricting the set of allocation matrices on which aggregation is intended to operate might open up the canon of acceptable
AAMs.
In conclusion, we regard Theorem 2 as having genuine, though not devastating, limitative import. For allocation aggregation problems can always be resolved in practice by taking weighted arithmetic averages of the individual values assigned to each variable and, if those averages fail to lie in V, adjusting them by rounding up or down, while ensuring that the adjusted values continue to sum to s. While such adjustments may be small in magnitude, they will inevitably be ad hoc, with the upshot that the procedure will fall short of ideally rational aggregation. 
Appendix
In order to prove Theorem 2, we need to establish two preliminary lemmata. The first involves the following property of aggregation, which strengthens IA:
Strong Label Neutrality (SLN). For all j,k {1,…,m}, and all A, BA(n,m;s,V),
In our setup, universal domain is implicit in our definition of an AAM as a mapping F with domain A(n,m;s,V). 5 See, for example, Wagner (2010) , where it is shown how one can avoid dictatorship results entailed by IA, ZP, and the demand for preservation of unanimous stochastic independence judgements by a natural restriction of the set of profiles of probability distributions to which an aggregation method must apply. 6 We are indebted to Franz Dietrich, Christian List and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper.
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Remark. Whereas IA is equivalent to the existence of functions f j : V n →V such that, for all AA(n,m;s,V), F(A) j = f j (A j ), SLN requires that the functions f j be identically equal to a single function f. Proof. See Lehrer and Wagner (1981, Theorem 6.2) . Note that while their theorem is stated for the case V = [0,s], its proof only invokes conditions (1), (2), and (3). (i) If  < s/r, then by repeated application of (3) it follows that k V, k =0,1,…,r, and hence by (2) that s -r V. By assumption, s -r > 0.
Moreover, s -r <  , for otherwise (r + 1)  s, which would imply that (r + 1) V and hence that |V| > (r + 1). But this contradicts the assumption that  is the smallest positive element of V.
(ii) If  > s/r, then r > s, and so r  V. Let m be the largest integer for which m Recall that V = {ks/r : k = 0,1,…,r}. By (6) and (7), (9) f(s/r) = f Hence, for all AA(n,m;s,V), F(A) = (f(A 1 ), f(A 2 ),…, f(A n )) = (a d1 , a d2 ,…,a dm ). □
